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EVol. XXVII

WHEREFORE, (plaintiff/defendant) respectfully requests the Court to instruct the (defendant/plaintiff) and its counsel and witnesses not to mention, refer to, interrogate concerning, or attempt to convey to the jury in any manner, either directly or indirectly, any
of the above-mentioned facts without first obtaining permission of the Court outside the
presence and hearing of the jury, and further to instruct the (defendant/plaintiff) and all
its counsel and witnesses not to make any reference to the fact that this motion has been
filed and granted, and to caution and warn said individuals and persons to follow these
same instructions strictly.

PRIVATE COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION:
FLORIDA'S PRACTICAL SOLUTION
In September 1969 a small oil barge ran aground and spilled its black
cargo into the waters off the coast of New England, initiating a series of
events that went far beyond the immediate and lingering stench of oil.'
Long after the oil had disappeared from view, the beaches were inundated
with dead animals and rotting vegetation until all marine life in the area
had been destroyed. Subsequently, the oil settled onto the ocean floor, invaded the inland marshes, destroyed the area's ecological cycle, and resurfaced 2 periodically for at least four years after the spill. 3 Although this and
countless similar spills have not generated as much public attention and
concern as recent massive spill disasters in major harbors, 4 the small spills
have resulted in much loss to the inhabitants and visitors of the nation's
coastal areas. 5 In Florida, where coastal waters and beaches are essential to
1. Wertenbaker, A Reporter at Large: A Small Spill, THE NEw YORKER, Nov. 26, 1973,
at 48.
2. Id. at 75. Stormy weather during the winter months periodically stirred up the oil
that had settled onto the ocean. floor.
3. The number of fishing and bathing areas affected by the spill increased tenfold
in the months after the spill because there was no longer any living matter to hold the
oil and prevent it from spreading. The areas were closed to the public in 1969 and 1970.
Some were reopened in June 1973, but most were still not open as of November 1973. Tests
taken during 1973 revealed that every sample of anything that was beginning to grow or
feed in the area had fuel oil in its tissues. Id. at 74.
4. The most disastrous oil spill in history occurred in 1967 when a tanker, the Torrey
Canyon, ran aground on a reef sixteen miles off the coast of Southern England. Between
15 and 30 million gallons of crude oil were released into the sea. Since then, major spills
have occurred off the coast of San Juan, Puerto Rico (3.5 million gallons in 1970), in the
Santa Barbara Channel (offshore well blowout), in San Francisco Bay (840,000 gallons),
and in Long Island Sound (,00,000 gallons). These major spills prompted numerous
articles. See generally E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE Torrey Canyon DISAsTER (1968);
Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400 (1967);
Comment, The Control of Pollution by Oil Under the Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 278 (1970).
5. Note, Admiralty Remedies for Vessel Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, 7 TLXAs
INT'L L.J. 121, 122-24 (1971).
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the economy, this type of small spill would affect not only residents in the
immediate area, but also those persons involved in every phase of the state's
coastal industries.
In 1971 Florida enacted the Oil Spill and Pollution Control Act 6 to
protect its valuable coastal waters from the spectre of oil spillage. The Act
was acclaimed7 as a mechanism through which the state could stringently
enforce its broad interest in maintaining beaches clean and free from oil.
Public reaction, however, was mixed. Environmental interest groups praised
the uniquely strong provision in the Act for the absolute and unlimited
liability of oil operators to the state for all costs of clean-up and other
damage.8 That same provision was equally criticized for its burden on oil
vessel owners desiring to stop in Florida ports.9
Absent from the 1971 Act was any provision granting private plaintiffs
in pollution damage suits certain procedural advantages 'given to the state.
While the state enjoyed a relaxed burden of proof arising from the absolute
liability imposed on oil polluters by the Act, 10 private plaintiffs were forced
to rely upon outmoded common law theories or unfavorable federal legislation to pursue personal claims. During the 1974 legislative session the oil
spill law was amended in an effort to rectify these inadequacies, especially as
they affected private litigants. The purpose of this commentary is to examine
the problems in existing statutory and common law remedies for individuals
attempting to recover oil pollution damages, and to suggest alternatives that
may be available to such private claimants. 1
PURPOSE OF THE FLORIDA LAW AND ITS AMENDMENT

Florida's Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act of 1971 establishes preservation of the state's seacoast as a matter of the highest urgency
and priority.' 2 The apparent rationale behind the Act is that private persons
6. FLA. STAT. §§376.011-.21 (1973), as amended Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §§1-19, at 812.
The new title of the Act is The Pollutant Spill Prevention and Control Act.
7. Comment, The Florida Oil Spill and Pollution Control Act, An Intrusion into the
Federal Maritime Domain, 12 NATURAL REsoURcEs J. 615, 626 (1972).
8. FLA. STAT. §376.12 (1973). This provision has been amended; see Fla. Laws 1974, ch.
74-336, §12, at 818, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(1).
9. McCoy, Oil Spill and Pollution Control: The Conflict Between State and Maritime
Law, 40 GEo. VAsn. L. REv. 97 (1971). The Act has been criticized because it was "unusually stringent . . . [in its unlimited liability provision and] considerable maritime traffic,
which would otherwise utilize Florida ports, will bypass the state. Vessel owners ... [would]
be further discouraged from risking calls at Florida ports by increases in [liability] insurance
premiums .... Id. at 122.
10. FLA. STAT. §376.12 (1973) provided that any licensee who permitted a discharge
would be liable to the state only for all costs of cleanup without any mention of liability
to private persons. This provision was amended in Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 819,
to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(2).
11. These problems are also discussed in Post, A Solution to the Problem of Private
Compensation in Oil Discharge Situations, 28 U. MIAMi L. REv. 524 (1974).
12. FLA. STAT. §376.021(2) (1973). See generally Little, Protection for Florida's Environment, 23 U. FA. L. REv. 459, 475-99 (1971).
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have a special interest in the Florida environment that extends beyond
ordinary property interests protected by traditional causes of action. 13 Before
its amendment the Florida law was the only one of its kind to implement
this policy both by placing unlimited liability for damage on oil operators"t
and by disallowing absolute defenses' 5 such as those permitted by similar
federal legislation.1- After much controversy concerning the benefits of these
provisions, balanced against their claimed burdens,' 7 both provisions were
amended, 18 presumably to encourage oil operators to frequent Florida ports
once again.
Under current law the liability of an oil vessel for any prohibited discharge is limited to the lesser of $14 million or $100 per gross ton of the
vehicle. 19 For discharges from terminal facilities the liability is limited to
$8 million. The amendment retains the provision erasing the state's burden
of proof in its actions for oil damage20 by eliminating the need to prove
negligence in any form.2' To the benefit of oil operators, however, the
amendment permits the alleged polluter to plead four defenses to avoid
liability. 2 Without more, this provision would present private persons suing

13. FLA. STAT. §376.021(3)(b) (1973). The statement of legislative intent in the Act
included the following: "Spills, discharges, and escapes of pollutants . . . pose threats
of great danger and damage to the environment of the state, to owners and users of shore
front property, to public and private recreation, to citizens of the state and other interests
deriving livelihood from marine-related activities, and to the beauty of the Florida
coast .... "
14. FLA. STAT. §376.12 (1973), amended by Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 818, to be

codified as
15.

FLA. STAT.

FLA. STAT.

to be codified as

§376.12(1).

§376.11(6)(b)

FLA. STAT.

(1973), amended by Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 820,

§376.12(4).

16. See note 25 infra.
17. The oil shippers alleged that they were unable to get insurance for their ships
while they were in Florida waters because the Florida law saddled them with unlimited
liability for an oil spill and allowed them no defenses against their liability, while environmentalists claimed these allegations were exaggerated. There was much debate in
the Florida Legislature as to the truth of these allegations. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times,
April 16, 1974, §B at 4.
18. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §§11, 12, at 817, 818.
19. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 818, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(1), also
provides that liability is not limited as such where the state can show that such discharge
was the result of willful or gross negligence or willful misconduct within the privity or
knowledge of the owner or operator or agent thereof. All payments are made to the coastal
protection trust fund, which administers all claims.
20. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 820, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(4), states:
"In any suit to enforce claims of the fund . . . it shall not be necessary for the department
in administering the fund to plead or prove negligence in any form or manner . . . [it]
need only plead and prove that the prohibited discharge or other polluting condition
occurred ..
"
21. Without the statute, of course, the state would have to meet traditional proof
burdens establishing proximate cause, negligence, or unseaworthiness.
22. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 820, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§376.12(4)(a)-(d).
In an action by the state to enforce a claim from the fund, the person alleged to be responsible
for the discharge may plead and prove as defenses (1) an act of war, (2) an act of government, (3) an act of God occasioned by the violence of nature without the interference of
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for pollution damages in Florida with obstacles identical to those encountered under federal legislation.2 3 In apparent recognition of this problem,
the amended act provides for a mechanism by which private persons -may
be reimbursed for pollution damage without resort to common law or federal
statutory remedies. The potential of this innovative provision to extend immediate and adequate compensation to private persons is best demonstrated
in an examination of traditional avenues of private redress for injury by
oil pollution.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The major federal oil pollution control legislation24 is the Water Quality
Improvement Act (WQIA).25 In order to claim and recover damages based
on the WQIA, private litigants are faced with formidable obstacles. An
individual must wait for action by the federal government, must overcome
any of the permitted defenses, 26 and may recover the cost of cleanup only to
the limits of the liability ceiling.27 Moreover, there is no provision for private
suits for property and related damages, which must instead be brought under
general maritime law.2 _
The corollary to the WQIA, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA),2 9 requires the Secretary of the Interior to screen all applications
for oil leases on the Outer Continental Shelf.30 The private individual's only
protection under this Act lies in the Secretary's discretion in authorizing
leasing arrangements for the Shelf,31 and in promulgating rules and regulaany human agency, or (4) any act or omission of a third party whether or not the act

was negligent.
23.

See text accompanying notes 25-26 infra.

24. Because there is extensive federal legislation in the area, the question of whether
state legislation in the area is preempted has been thoroughly discussed. See Bradford,
Maine's Oil Spill Legislation: Can a State with an Extensive Interest in Its Coastal Resources
Protect Itself from Inadequacies in National and International Law, 7 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 1
(1971); McCoy, supra note 9; Rathje, Saving Byron's Sea: Federal and State Regulation of
Oil Pollution from Ocean Petroleum Industry, 22 HASnNcs LJ. 485 (1971).
25. 33 U.S.C. §§1151-75 (1970).
26. 33 U.S.C. §1161(f) (1970). The Act permits a defendant to assert defenses of an
act of God, war, negligence on the part of the United States or an act or omission of a
third party. They are treated as complete defenses.
27. 33 U.S.C. §1161(f)(1) (1970). The ultimate financial liability for vessels is set at
$100 per gross ton br $14 million, whichever is less. See also Note, Liability for Oil Pollution
Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 976-77
(1970).
28. 33 U.S.C. §1161(o)(1) (1970).
29. 43 U.S.C. §§1331-43 (1970).
30, Id.
31. Occasionally, the Secretary of the Interior has exercised his discretion under the
OCSLA in favor of environmental interests. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141 (9th

Cir. 1973), the court upheld the Secretary's order to suspend all oil leases in the Santa
Barbara Channel as a result of the oil spill there. The suspension was to continue until
a complete environmental impact statement could be made, based on his determination
that risk posed to the marine environment by drilling outweighed immediate national

interest in exploring and drilling for oil and gas.
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tions for prevention of waste.3 2 No claim for damages is available; a3 violations
of the Act are redressed only by fine, imprisonment, or revocation of the
lease.

34

The Santa Barbara Channel spill is a primary example of the inadequacy
of this federal legislation in preventing oil spills. Intensive investigations of the
well blowout there revealed that a lack of geological information and a lack
of cooperation among federal agencies were major contributing factors to
the spill.35 Specifically, three major flaws in federal legislation were brought
to light by the Santa Barbara spill. First, the rules did not ensure that
hearings would be held to allow objections to leasing and drilling to be aired
publicly. Second, government agencies knew too little of the geology of the
leased area and relied on information presented by prospective lessees. Third,
governmental agencies' inspection and supervisory procedures were so limited
that the public interest was detrimentally affected. 36 Of course, since the
channel disaster the federal legislation involved has been comprehensively
amended and improved, but there is reason to believe that the same problems
still exist.

7

An additional obstacle to recovery by private parties under federal law is
the Limitation of Liability Act (LLA) .3 For example, if the private litigant,
who must bear the cost of litigation, were to establish the requisite in rem
or in personam jurisdiction in admiralty over the polluter, 39 and then prove
liability, this Act might still prevent a reasonable recovery.40 Fortunately,
32. 43 U.S.C. §1334(a)(1) (1970).
33. In County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970), private landowners brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin all offshore drilling operation adjacent to California. Prompted by the major Santa Barbara oil spill, the plaintiffs
alleged that the Secretary had exceeded his statutory authority by awarding oil leases
and disregarding the negligent and ultra hazardous activities of the oil operations. Plaintiffs
also urged that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was unconstitutional. The court
denied their claim and held that the plaintiffs could not show they would otherwise suffer
irreparable injury or that they were entitled to a hearing.
34. See Note, supra note 27, at 980.
35. Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel, after observing the Santa Barbara oil
slick, was reported to have said that it was as much the fault of the Government as
anyone and that the oil indusiry had followed the federal regulations but the rules were
not rigid enough to prevent the pollution. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1969, at 78, col. 1.
36. Note, The Oil Men and the Sea: The Future of Ocean Resource Development in
Light of Santa Barbara-Some Proposals To Rectify Continuing Inadequate Federal Regulation of Offshore Leasing, 11 Aiaz. L. REV. 677, 721 (1969).
37. Id. at 727.
38. 46 U.S.C. §183(a) (1970) states in part: "The liability of the owner of any vessel,
whether American or foreign . . . for any loss, damage or injury . . . done, occasioned or
,incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner . . . shall not . . . exceed the
amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then
pending." The LLA governs suits brought in admiralty against shipowners for damage
caused by their vessels. No matter what the plaintiff might prove as damages, his recovery
is limited by the LLA ceiling.
39. See Note, supra note 5, at 128.
40. Under the technicalities of the LLA, a vessel owner's total liability could be reduced
to the value of the vessel and the pending freight after the accident. If the vessel were to
sink, liability would be zero. Consequently, "It is fantastic to consider that, had the
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however, recent courts have been hesitant to invoke the LLA,41 favoring instead the strong public policy of minimizing pollution and encouraging
prompt cleanup of escaped pollution and other sunken waste. 42 Nevertheless,
this trend is of little consolation to private landowners, who are still faced
with the necessity of meeting the traditional proof burdens" before recovering
at all.
JUDICIAL REFMEDIES AND THE DIFFICULT BURDEN OF PROOF

Aside from possible actions based on federal legislation, the civil and
admiralty courts have provided the most accessible means of redress for private
oil pollution claims. The traditional forms of action in those courts, 44 however,
have impeded modern private suits because technology and oil monopolies
45
have made the plaintiff's burden of proof increasingly difficult to carry.
Common Law Remedies
Private suits for oil pollution based on common law doctrines without
regard to applicable legislation may be brought in any court where jurisdiction is properly obtained. 48 There are a few advantages in the use of common
law theories, including the number of alternatives available 47 and the judicial
trend favoring a broadened base for private pollution suits.48 Despite these
advantages, private litigants have been generally unsuccessful in surmounting
the required burden of proof.49
Torrey Canyon been wrecked off the coast of Florida, the shipowner would have been
insulated totally from liability." Shutler, Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 7 HouSTON L. REv.
415, 438 (1970).
41. Chinese Maritime Trust, Ltd. v. Panama Canal Co., 478 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. Id. at 1361. See also Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
43. "In the pollution context . . . the use of traditional proof burdens involves an
unequivocal social decision to favor the one who pollutes and to frustrate expectations of
those claiming that a higher right lies in the protection of their environment." Whether the
action is in admiralty, trespass, absolute liability, negligence, or nuisance the plaintiff's
burden of proof includes proof of negligence, proof that defendant caused the polluting
act and proof of damages. Wilkes, Constitutional Dilemmas Posed by State Policies Against
Marine Pollution-The Maine Example, 23 MAINE L. REv. 143, 159 (1971).
44. These include trespass, negligence, public nuisance, and private nuisance. See
generally Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUal. L. REv. 734 (1970).
45. See text accompanying notes 56-60.
46. Federal legislation purposefully leaves undisturbed the remedies in common law
available for private injury and permits state legislation to fill the voids where federal law
does not provide a needed remedy. See Comment, supra note 7, at 616.
47. See note 44 supra.
48. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973); Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1973), appeal dismissed, 286 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1973).
49. See Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FOaRHAm L. REv. 155, 170-81 (1968).
There is not only difficulty with the burden of proof, but also private parties are reluctant
to bring an action in the first place for fear that the expense of litigation would be far
beyond the amount of their claim. Post, Private Compensation for Injuries Sustained by
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The paucity of modern oil pollution suits attests to the difficulties of
adapting the common law remedies to the present needs of private litigants
who have suffered damage5 0 In theory, at least, the civil courts constitute
the sole branch of government easily accessible to private citizens concerned
with oil pollution. Yet the courts have remained rigid in requiring private
individuals to prove traditional elements of the cause of action in trespass,5 1
negligence,5 2 or nuisance53 Most federal legislation in the area, as well as
Florida's oil spill statute, was created simply to give government claims a
liberalized burden of proof. 54 This would seem to show that, as far as government claims were concerned, the old theories of common law were inadequate for modern oil pollution suits. Contrasting the private and governmental remedies, one commentator has asked:
Are not the damages suffered by private hotel, fishing and wildlife
interests the responsibility of the tanker owners and equally as important as the clean-up costs suffered by the Government? Is it at all
proper that limits be substantially improved for recoveries by the
Government but left totally unchanged from what they were in 1851
for recoveries by private citizens? 55
The difficulties in a plaintiff's common law proof burden are threefold:
(1) proof of negligence; (2) proof of causation, foreseeability or identification
of the polluter; and (3) proof of damages.56 Generally, the private litigant
cannot prove negligence57 due to his complete lack of knowledge and control
over the relevant facts concerning oil operations. 58 As a practical matter, recovery may be excluded by failure to identify the polluter in the face of a
defendant's evidence that another vessel or oil rig was in the locality. 5
the Discharge of Oil from Vessels on the Navigable Waters of the United States, 4 J. MARI(1972).
50. See Note, supra note 44, at 735.
51. Rylands v. Fletcher, I Ex. 265 (1866). This case is the classic example of application
of trespass and absolute liability for indirect invasion of another's land.
52. In negligence actions the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that duty through an act or omission, (3) that
damage resulted to the plaintiff, and (4) that the legal cause of the plaintiff's damage
was the defendant's act or omission. Post, supra note 49, at 40.
53. The choice of common law theory on which to base the suit depends on the
nature of damages and the nature of the plaintiff. A beachfront owner whose property
was physically damaged would most likely sue in trespass or nuisance, while a nonbeachfront owner suing for business profits would attempt (less successfully) to sue in trespass
or negligence. Id. at 38-43.
54. E.g., Water Quality Improvement Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1151-75 (1970); FLA. STAr.
§376.12 (1973). Both give government claims the benefits of absolute liability burdens of
proof in suits for damages for cleanup.
55. Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution-Domestic and International
Law, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 8 (1969).
56. Shutler, supra note 40, at 434-41.
57. See, e.g., Wohlford v. American Gas Prod. Co., 218 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1955).
58. See Shutler, supra note 40, at 435.
59. Id. Often, tankers will intentionally empty their oil ballasts for cleaning while
at sea, causing oil deposits that eventually inundate beaches. A named defendant need

WIsE L. & COMMERCE 25, 39
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Finally, the private individual's ignorance of the science of ecology may preclude his proof of damages where the defendant's expert testifies that the
pollution had in fact no detrimental effect on the property. 60
In a typical case, 61 an oyster farmer attempted to prove a negligent overflow from defendant's well resulting in oyster contamination. The defendant
presented evidence denying negligence, established that there was one other
well in the area and, through expert testimony, maintained that the oysters
had no oil taste and were completely marketable.6 2 The court held that the
63
plaintiff had failed in his burden of proof and had no compensable loss.
This situation has given rise to the belief that the-use of traditional procedural
burdens has, in modern practice, favored those who pollute and frustrated
64
the expectations of those claiming a right to environmental protection.
It has been suggested that "the most reasonable way to reverse the trend
toward environmental destruction abetted by past procedural burdens is to
shift those burdens to the person seeking to alter the coastlines and their
waters." 65 Though a defendant's liability would still have to be established,
plaintiffs' recoveries would not be so quickly precluded if oil operators had
the burden to present evidence to overcome a presumption of liability. Further, application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may have the effect of
shifting the burden of proof by raising an inference of negligence by the defendant, which must then be overcome. 66 Nevertheless, res ipsa loquitur will
be ineffective where the polluting act is relatively unpublicized and the
plaintiff cannot prove the required causal relationship between the act of
pollution and the injury to his property. 67 At most, the doctrine would only
reduce the necessary quantity of proof of negligence, still requiring proof
that the defendant alone caused the pollution that resulted in the damage.
Actions Based on Admiralty and Maritime Law
An alternate form of private action is provided by the law of admiralty,
which permits an individual to sue for damages for injury occurring "in
waters which are navigable in interstate or foreigi commerce." 68 To cover
only show that this could have been the cause of plaintiff's damage or that the correct
polluter cannot be identified in order to preclude recovery. See note 111 infra.
60. "Since ecology is a new science, it includes both clearly established areas of
cause-and-effect and areas in which the specific causalities are not yet so unequivocally
established that no conflict of testimony is possible. . . . When specific proof is needed to
show that particular pollution activity will cause a particular loss, however, the newness
of the science of ecology guarantees that at least one 'expert' is prepared to take a skeptical
stance. Thus the determination of who has the burden of proof on the detrimental effects
of specific pollution is vitally important." Wilkes, supra note 43, at 164.
61. Trosclair v. Superior Oil Co., 219 So. 2d 278 (Cir. Ct. App. La. 1969).
662.

Id. at 280-81.

63. Id. at 281.
64.

Wilkes, supra note 43, at 159.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 160.
See Sweeney, supra note 49, at 180.
See Roskey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 387 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
McCoy, supra note 9, at 98.
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situations in which the act of pollution occurred in admiralty waters but
the damage was done on land or in nonadmiralty waters, the Extension of
Admiralty Act6 9 was passed in 1948. Where oil pollution has caused damage,
two threshold determinations must be made before invoking admiralty jurisdiction: (1) whether the injury occurs to "property" within the meaning
of the Admiralty Extension Act,70 and (2) whether the situs of the tort is
within admiralty jurisdiction.71 Once jurisdiction has been established, the
private litigant may possibly prevail,72 although he must again overcome
7
a formidable burden of proof.

3

For example, the maritime tort for oil pollution requires proof of
negligence7 4 or of some unseaworthy condition in order to impose liability
on the shipowner. Pollution claimants have failed to recover due to their
inability to prove negligence or to identify the exact polluter, 75 a task that
is especially difficult when pollution originates in busy shipping lanes. 6 In
one instance under admiralty jurisdiction, beachfront owners did recover
compensation for an oil spill from a barge. 77 Negligence was easily proved,
however, because the pumpman fell asleep while discharging the oil.78
Though the commissioner hearing the evidence on damages-9 took into
account inconvenience, loss of aesthetic value, decrease in swimming, and
out-of-pocket expenses the final award was well below the claimed amount.s0
Thus, even where plaintiff clearly meets his burden of proof, his claim is
subject to the decisions of judges who may see their role as that of protector
of the development of industry that will benefit society as a whole, rather

69. 46 U.S.C. §740 (1970) states: "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or
injury be done or consummated on land."
70. State law is used to determine the meaning of property because the Act does
not specifically define property. See McCoy, supra note 9, at 99.
71. Id. Though the Admiralty Extension Act extends admiralty jurisdiction to state
coastal lands, the Supreme Court has held that the Act was not meant to be exclusive.
State law, such as the Florida oil spill law, can still be enforced. Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). See Post, supra note 11, at 543-47.
72. E.g., United States v. Ladd, 193 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1952); Carr v. United States,
136 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Va. 1955); Portland Tug & Barge Co. v. United States, 90 F.
Supp. 593 (D. Ore. 1949).
73. See generally Mendelsohn, supra note 55.
74. Roberts v. St. Marks Towing Co., 129 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Fla. 1955).
75. Salaky v. Atlas Barge No. 3, 208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953).
76. See Sweeney, supra note 49, at 167.
77. In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
78. See Sweeney, supra note 49, at 166.
79. In admiralty practice, a commissioner is customarily appointed to hear the evidence
on damages.
80. The original amount claimed was $603,612.27. The commissioner awarded $54,423.93
to be divided among the 155 beachfront owners, or approximately $360 to each damaged
beachfront owner. The commissioner rejected traditional mathematical formulas used to
fix damages with some degree of certainty in favor of a more discretionary and subjective
"formula." In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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than that of protector of the rights of individuals harmed by industrial
growth. 8 '
The weight of policy arguments dearly favors the complete shift of the
burden of proof in admiralty and common law actions to the polluter by
holding him absolutely liable for damage to the private individual.8 2 In light
of the unique concentration of power, resources and control in the oil industry and the general public ignorance and lack of resources, this shift is
justified. The owner or operator of an oil facility is in a better position than
the private individual to prevent discharges and to disprove liability for spills
that do occur.8 3 Further, the burden is more easily borne economically4 by
the oil industry because it is conducting operations precisely for the purpose
of making a profit, and the cost of an accident should be considered as a
cost of doing business.s Under these conditions, it is more logical to extend
the theory of strict liability in the context of civil suits for damage to private
landowners.8 6

THE

FLORIDA ALTERNATIVEs

The recent amendment to the Florida Oil Spill Law provides a functional
remedy for private persons suffering from oil pollution. The amendment,
which also eases the burden on oil operators,87 contains a provision -whereby
private persons may be compensated immediately for pollution damage88
directly from a fund established specifically for that purpose. 9 The procedure
requires persons claiming injury to file an application with a sworn statement of damages suffered. The claimant and the person responsible for the
polluting discharge90 then may attempt to agree upon a settlement or may
81.

See generally Note, supra note 5, at 121.

82. Senator Edmund Muskie has commented: "It strikes me to be a rather unusual
situation when the owner of shore property who finds himself inundated from the sea
by the results of an oil spill is told he must prove negligence against the unseen perpetrator ... of the spill in order to get damages ...
it seems to me that the nature of the
problem of proof is so unusual as to suggest some different definition of liability." Hearing
on S. 7 and S. 544 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm.

on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 1370 (1959).
83. Note, supra note 27, at 985.
84. Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 359, 367 (1970).
85. See Note, supranote 27, at 984.
86. Comment, supra note 7, at 625-26.
87. The new amendment to the law eased the burden on oil operators of absolute and
unlimited liability to the state for oil damage by allowing the four defenses and placing
a ceiling on liability. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 818, 820, to be codified as FLA. STAT.
§§376.12(1), (4)(a)-(d). See note 22 supra.
88. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §11, at 817, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.11(1).
89. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §11, at 817, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.11(1), states:
"The purpose of this section is to provide for cleanup and rehabilitation after a pollutant
has been discharged, to prevent further damage by the pollutant, and to pay for damages.
It is the legislative intent that this section be liberally construed to effect the purposes set
forth."
90. The amendment provides that the executive director of the fund, an agent of
the state, is charged with determining who is responsible for the prohibited discharge.
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submit the claim to arbitration. 91 In either case payment is made directly
from the fund to the claimant. If the amount of proved damages exceeds
the amount available from the fund, the claimant is given the right to a
prorata share from the fund92 until the total claim is paid. 93 The traditional
procedural burdens on private plaintiffs are eliminated in this administrative
scheme, making compensation for even indirect pollution injury such as loss of
94
profits or aesthetic enjoyment considerably less difficult to procure.
Nevertheless, there are procedural restrictions that, though flexible, may
lead certain claimants to forego this statutory remedy or to use it carefully.
First, submission of a claim to arbitration for recovery from the fund is a
waiver of all other remedies, 95 and any damages omitted in the claim are
also deemed to be waived, 96 as well. Additionally, any final settlement is
binding on all parties and not subject to collateral attack or subsequent
judicial actionY7 Finally, the time limit for application of a claim against
the fund is twelve months after the action arises, 8 and all claims are
necessarily limited by the amount in the fund at any one time. For ordinary
pollution damage not precipitated by a major spill disaster, however, a
private individual would be well advised to utilize fully the state's administrative procedure for a simplified access to adequate compensation. In any case,
Fla. Laws. 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 819, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(2)(b). Consequently,
persons filing their claims through the administrative procedure are apparently relieved of
the burden to prove proximate cause or identify the polluter.
91. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 819, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(3) states:
"The board of arbitration shall consist of three (3) persons: [O]ne (1) to be chosen by
the persons determined by the department to have caused the discharge or by the fund
if the discharge is of unknown original [sic] and one (1) person chosen by the first two (2)
appointed members to serve as a neutral arbitrator .... .. " The hearings before this
board are informal, though there is provision that the board has the power to administer
oaths and to subpoena according to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
92. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 814, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(2)(b).
93. It is then the duty of the department administering the fund to diligently pursue
the reimbursement of sums expended to the fund in a suit on behalf of the fund against
the alleged polluter. It is in this action that the state need not plead or prove negligence
but only that the discharge occurred. Likewise, during this suit the alleged polluter may
raise the permitted defenses. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 820, to be codified as FLA.
STAT. §376.12(4).
94. In 1970 the State of Maine enacted a private compensation provision very similar
to the Florida provision. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §551(2) (Supp. 1973). An appraisal
of the Maine provision is now applicable to the Florida law. "From the claimant's standpoint [the approach] is a most adequate one, for not only are the damages that can be
recovered . . . extremely comprehensive, but also the claimant can be compensated
for his injury in a minimal period of time. Furthermore, because compensation is
sought outside a forum over which substantive maritime law would be applicable, the
federal Limitation of Liability Act will not affect any award given to the claimant by
the arbitral panel. In fact, the claimant is guaranteed full compensation despite the
financial status of the owner of the vessel which caused the claimant's damage, or the
condition or value of the vessel itself." Post, supra note 46, at 51.
95. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 819, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(2)(d).
96. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 819, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(2)(c).
97. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 819, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(2)(a).
98. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 819, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(2).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 10
1975]

PRIVATE COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION

the individual still has the option of bringing the claim directly to court,
but this alternative may be illusory given recent affirmance of ancient restrictions on standing to maintain public nuisance actions.
In a private suit in public nuisance for oil pollution damages, courts have
ordinarily required that the litigant be specially injured, suffering damages different in kind from the rest of the community. 9 A typical instance involved
parties whose weekly boat ride in the Santa Barbara Channel was rendered impossible by an oil spill obstructing navigation in the channel. The plaintiffs
sued for loss of navigational rights in the channel resulting in "loss of use" of
their boats. Because they were unable to show a special injury, the claim was
found to be in public nuisance and relief was denied. 00 A Florida district court
recently sought to alter the doctrine in Florida, holding that a private person
may sue for relief in public nuisance whether or not such right is special to
him.10 ' The Florida supreme court, however, fearing "no end to potential
litigation against a given defendant ... brought by individuals or residents,
all possessed of the same general interest," reversed, adhering to the special
10 2
injury requirement.
Removal of the special injury requirement would have permitted more
landowners to recover for a wider variety of "property" damages previously
unrecoverable under the common law theories of action.' 0 3 Thus, despite increasing judicial recognition of the need to protect the environment, 0 4 private
individuals and groups may expect little more success in Florida courts on
the public nuisance theory than their predecessors suing in admiralty,
negligence, or trespass, or under federal' 0 5 or state statutes.1 6
The Florida pollution law itself might serve as a basis for expanding
available judicial remedies. While the law does not authorize private suits,
it is clear that private landowners are among the class of persons 0 7 that the
statute was intended to protect. By implying a private cause of action from
the state statute, the private litigant might gain the benefit of having the
99. See, e.g., Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Sarasota County
Anglers Club v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (1st D.C.A.), aff'd sub nom. Sarasota County Anglers
Club v. Kirk, 200 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967).
100. Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
101. Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1973). The court required only that the litigating party must have directly and personally

suffered or be about to suffer an injury. Id. at 577.
102. United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).

103. Rathje, supra note 24, at 518.
104. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
105. E.g., County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970).
106. At this writing no private suits based on the Florida Oil Spill Law have reached
the appellate courts.
107. Cf. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Rule lOb-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was interpreted to imply that its criminal sanctions
were intended to protect an identifiable class of persons conferring a private cause of
action against any person who violated the provision of the criminal statute. The same
inference might be made with respect to the Florida Pollution Law to give private persons

a cause of action coinciding with a state claim.
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state's burden of proof applied to his claim. Such an extension, however,
would grant wide discretion to the judge who must decide whether the
private claimant's burden of proof in a particular action is to be the same as
the express burden of a state claimlo1 or that of traditional common law. The
possibility for abuse of such discretion in statutory interpretation has been
well demonstrated in other areas of the law, and such abuse may harm more
than aid the private landowner's cause for lack of predictability in the long
run.10 9 One solution is to include in the statute a private right to institute
a civil action for oil pollution and extend the same procedural burden to
private persons as that required of the state. 110
CONCLUSION

Though the focus of this commentary is on private compensation for oil
pollution, another aspect of private pollution control deserves brief mention.
To some, the prevention of pollution is far more valuable than compensating
The
its victims, yet no law provides for this type of private grievance.'
effectiveness of the amended Florida pollution law might be somewhat improved, therefore, by giving private persons a stake in the prevention of oil
pollution. One method of doing so would be to institute an administrative
procedure permitting all interested parties to present evidence based on
adequate information112 at a public hearing on the question of whether a
license should issue to a vessel or terminal facility. 1' 3 Because the legislature
108. The burden of proof for the state consists only in pleading and proving the
fact of the prohibited discharge and that it occurred. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 336, §12, at 820.
to be codified as FLA. STAT. §376.12(4).
109. After the private cause of action was judicially added to the Securities Exchange
Act through §10(b) and rule lOb-5, there was great confusion among the circuits as to
the elements in plaintiff's burden of proof. Compare Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), with Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). See also Note.
Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1963).
110. The State of Washington has such a provision in its Water Pollution Statute.
(Supp. 1973). The need for this provision is
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 90, §90.48.336
more compelling in states that do not offer the practical administrative procedure for recovery that Florida presently does.
111. For example, private citizens in South Florida recently suffered oil pollution
caused by ships discharging removable waste oil from ballast tanks while passing in
proximity to the shore. Seeking to prevent more oil from washing up on the beaches,
the local League of Cities advocated new legislation setting a penalty of $50,000 for such
pollution and specifying a maximum distance from coastlines where ballasts containing tar
may be released. Resolution of the Dade County League of Cities, June 6, 1974. Though
the Florida pollution law amendment affords adequate compensation for this type of
complaint, the instance seems to illustrate that where the private person's interest is
in pollution prevention, there is still an inadequacy in the law.
112. See Rathje, supra note 24, at 514: "Oil companies have competent public relations agencies capable of presenting persuasive arguments for the need to permit drilling
in any given area. Any hearing designed to investigate the wisdom of allowing drilling in
a particular area will become an exercise in administrative futility unless parties opposed
to leasing are as competently represented as the petroleum companies ....
113. In County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970), the plaintiffs
attempted to claim that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act entitled the public to a

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 10

1975]

PRIVATE COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION

could be heavily influenced by oil lobby pressure at any time,114 such public
hearings may be the only medium through which the public can express its
interest in saving Florida's beaches from oil pollution.
For private persons who have suffered pollution damage, the amended
law should be commended for providing a most practical and simplified
route to adequate compensation. The primary purpose of the original Florida
pollution law was to give the individual citizen a means to deal more
effectively with oil pollution problems confronting private and public interests.
The amendment has finally granted those for whom protection was intended
a remedy of their own with which to enforce the statutory rights. If the
remedy is now utilized to its fullest potential, it may be hoped that the
present Act will successfully help keep Florida's beaches free from oil.
KATHRYN KATZ

hearing before the issuance of any oil leases off the coast of California. The court held
that such hearings were not required by the act but "[t]his is not to say that . . . a
higher official in the hierarchy of the Department of the Interior, may not call for a
hearing, or that such a hearing ought not to be granted under circumstances . . . involved in this litigation.... [It would appear to be a salutary practice for the appropriate
officials to adopt a liberal attitude towards the granting of hearings in matters of such
public importance ....
" Id. at 169 n.8.
114. It has been noted that at the time of the passage of Florida's original oil
spill law "Florida's Legislature, with innumerable constituents and lobbyists concerned with
waterfront-oriented tourism and with neither oil production nor petroleum refineries in
the state, was not caught in a dilemma of major rival interests.
... McCoy, supra note 9,
at 111 n.83. In light of the 1973-1974 energy shortage, this statement no longer applies.
The legislators are under increased pressure to allow the fuel to flow in Florida. St.
Petersburg (Fla.) Times, April 16, 1974, §B, at 4,
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